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H9 viruses appear to be of low pathogenicity, while H5 and H7 viruses can be highly pathogenic for birds. However, low pathogenic forms of these viruses seem to be the cause of most outbreaks among poultry causing only mild or imperceptible illness and low mortality rates. Nonetheless, both H5 and H7 can develop high levels of pathogenicity in which case mortality rates in poultry flocks can reach 100%. 2 The natural history of avian influenza viruses is characterized by spread through infected nasal, respiratory and fecal material, and a reservoir state in healthy birds. Outbreaks of avian influenza in poultry flocks have regularly occurred in many areas of the world including the United States. Since 1997, at least 16 outbreaks of H5 and H7 avian influenza have been documented among poultry by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. In addition, low pathogenic subtypes of avian influenza viruses have been found to be endemic in wild waterfowl and migratory birds. 3 While the many subtypes of avian influenza are of low pathogenicity, some inflict high mortality rates among birds, other animals, and humans. One that is of particular concern is H5N1, which has recently caused serious epizootics among animal species and cases in humans. While most of the human cases appear to have been acquired from birds, one instance of possible human-to-human transmission may have occurred in September 2004 in Thailand. 4 The first documented spread of H5N1 from chickens to humans occurred in Hong Kong in 1997. Eighteen people were hospitalized, and six died. Since that time, other human cases have been documented due to different strains including H9N2, H7N2, H7N3, H7N7, and H5N1. Most of these human cases were associated with outbreaks in poultry. However, in a few, the sources of infection could not be determined, and in one case in Hong Kong in 1999, the possibility of person-to-person spread could not be excluded. 4 The capacity of H5N1 for infecting other animal species has now been well documented. As among poultry, this virus has caused a very high mortality among tigers and leopards, and shown an ability to infect domestic cats. [5] [6] [7] This expansion in ability of H5N1 to infect species other than birds increases the risks of animal-to-human infection. It also indicates that some current H5 viruses have acquired an ability to more easily infect mammals, unlike their predecessor H5 viruses. 8 The lethality of the H5N1 virus is underscored by the 35 human cases and 23 deaths that occurred in Thailand and Vietnam between December 30, 2003 and March 17, 2004. 8 While most of these resulted from poultry-to-human transmission, they indicate that this particular virus is especially lethal for humans.
The ability of influenza A viruses to shift, that is re-assort their gene segments and produce a new virus, creates serious concerns about H5N1. In principle, H5N1 could re-assort its eight gene segments with those of a current human influenza A virus in an animal reservoir such as a pig. This could result in new virus which might retain the hemagglutinin and/or neuraminidase from H5N1 and the human-to-human transmission ability of the other virus. The resulting virus would be easily transmitted in the human population, which would have no immunity to it. 9 This could result in a severe world-wide pandemic characterized by alarmingly high morbidity and mortality rates, similar to those observed in the 1918-1919 pandemic. 10, 11 While there is currently no evidence that the H5N1 virus has reassorted its genetic segments with a human influenza A virus, the possibility that it could have led the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to launch a number of preventive initiatives, and issue guidelines and recommendations for both public health practitioners and individuals. [12] [13] [14] [15] CDC's domestic activities regarding H5N1 have been ongoing since 2004. In February 2004, CDC issued a set of recommendations regarding surveillance for H5N1. In August 2004, a Health Alert Network (HAN) message was issued once again outlining the criteria for domestic surveillance, diagnostic work-up, infection control procedures, and laboratory testing for H5N1. CDC also organized three training workshops for state laboratories in conjunction with the Association of Public Health Laboratories. In collaboration with the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists and other public health groups, CDC has been providing assistance to states with pandemic planning efforts. Efforts are also under way to plan for antiviral stockpiling and the development of a vaccine against the H5N1 virus. The CDC, WHO, and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) are currently testing the safety of vaccine seed candidates and developing additional vaccine virus seed candidates for H5N1. 16 CDC has also set up a special influenza group to oversee its activities regarding avian influenza.
Both WHO and CDC have provided technical epidemiologic and training assistance to Vietnam, where a number of human cases have occurred. In addition, CDC has held several training sessions in Asia in order to enhance the abilities of national and local public health authorities to detect human cases and to diagnose them by current laboratory techniques. CDC has also allocated funds to support influenza surveillance in Asia. These initiatives by the CDC and those undertaken by WHO have collectively resulted in greatly improved on-site surveillance and influenza control systems in Asia collaboratively directed by national and international partners. Some of these surveillance and control strategies proved highly effective in containing outbreaks of Severe Acute Respiratory syndrome (SARS), for which there was no available vaccine. Among these is the use of quarantine, which was recently applied by Executive Order of President George W. Bush to ''Influenza caused by novel or re-emergent influenza viruses that are causing, or have the potential to cause, a pandemic.'' 17 The natural history of the avian influenza H5N1 subtype is still evolving. However, as it does so, the CDC, WHO, and national and local public health agencies are putting into place advanced epidemiologic surveillance systems, rapid laboratory diagnostic techniques, uniform case management standards, and disease control and prevention strategies that could help mitigate the severity of any outbreak or epidemic. The availability of an effective vaccine and antiviral agents could curtail even further the morbidity and mortality associated with any epidemic. However, that said, it is difficult to predict with any certainty the ultimate epidemiologic course of an avian influenza pandemic in humans and the effectiveness of currently known measures to combat it.
